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NOTES
Private International Broadcasting From the United
States: Toward an Understanding of
a Content Standard
"The theory of freedom of expression .... It does not come naturally to the
ordinary citizen but needs to be learned. It must be restated and reiterated not
only for each generation, but for each new situation."
International radio broadcasting from the United States began
prior to 19121 and continues today, albeit in a much more sophisti-
cated manner. 2 The U.S. Department of State sponsors the majority
of international broadcasts through the Voice of America (VOA).3
In addition, a growing number of private individuals broadcast inter-
nationally. 4 Although these private broadcasts are regulated by the
* T. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 894
(1963).
1 See generally E. BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1966) .
2 Early international radio communications were merely signals in Morse code. As
time passed, the human voice was transmitted and eventually messages were broadcast in
the native language of the receiving country. See generally D. BROWNE, INTERNATIONAL RA-
DIO BROADCASTING, THE LIMITLESS MEDIUM (1982).
3 VOA was created pursuant to the United States Information and Educational Ex-
change Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-402, 62 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1431-1480 (1982)) [hereinafter Smith-Mundt Act]. The objectives of the Smith-Mundt
Act were "to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understand-
ing of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between
the people of the United States and the people of other countries." Id. § 2. These objec-
tives were to be achieved by creating "an information service to disseminate abroad infor-
mation about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the
President, the Secretary of State, and other responsible officials of Government having to
do with matters affecting foreign affairs . I..." Id  § 2(1).
4 Currently there are nine private stations in operation. They include: KNLS in
Anchor Point, Alaska; KYOI in Agingan Point, Saipan, Northern Marianna Islands; WRNO
in New Orleans, Louisiana; KGEI in Redwood City, California; KFBS in Marpi, Saipan,
Northern Marianna Islands; WYFR in Okeechokee, Florida; KTWR in Agana, Guam;
WINB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania; and KCBI in Denton, Texas. In addition, there are nine
new stations under construction. Two have construction permits on file with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and four have submitted requirements for future
planned stations. Federal Communications Commission, Unofficial List of Mailing Ad-
dresses of FCC Licensed High Frequency Broadcast Stations (Oct. 1985) (unpublished
document); Personal interview with Charlie Breig, Supervisory Engineer for High Fre-
quency Broadcasting at the FCC (Oct. 22, 1985) [hereinafter Breig interview]. If all 15
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Federal Communications Commission (FCC),5 VOA is not.
The private broadcaster has the unique power to directly impart
information to a foreign country. Therefore, a balance must be
struck between his or her first amendment right to free speech6 and
potential applicants are licensed, there will be 24 privately owned stations in the United
States.
5 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.701- .788 (1985).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. When the United States entered World War 11 the Of-
fice of Censorship issued broadcasting guidelines for international radio operators. The
preface to these guidelines provides an example of the attempt to balance national security
concerns and free speech protection:
American short wave stations bear a particular responsibility in the ap-
plication of censorship to the radio broadcasting industry. The fact that their
broadcasts reach-and are intended to reach--every part of the world makes
it doubly necessary that they continue to exercise the utmost caution and the
most expert judgment as to the character of the material they transmit.
Their special task is to see that, while acting as an unofficial but indispensable
arm of the Government in keeping their world-wide audience truthfully in-
formed, no information be divulged that might conceivably be of value to the
enemy.
It is of prime importance that all who have any part in short wave broad-
casting keep constantly in mind that the fact that news or other material ap-
pears on the news agency wires or in the newspapers or other periodicals
does not automatically make it appropriate for short wave broadcast. A con-
siderable volume of such news is not appropriate for transmission abroad.
When in doubt as to this, short wave stations are asked to consult a represen-
tative of the Office of Censorship.
Memo to Short Wave Station Managers from the Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime
Practices for American Short Wave Broadcasters, (Feb. 3, 1942) (unpublished document).
The perceived power of private broadcasters to effect national security is best illustrated
by noting some of the information the Office of Censorship prohibited the licensees from
broadcasting: for example,
No material should be broadcast which divulges any information, di-
rectly or indirectly, concerning the following subjects unless such informa-
tion is specifically released for short wave by a competent federal authority:
(a) Meteorological data, including weather forecasts, temperature readings,
barometric pressure, wind direction and all other data relating to weather
conditions;
(b) The assembly, movement, composition, disposition, employment, equip-
ment or personnel of U.S. or allied armed forces at home or abroad;
(c) The location, arrival and departure, concentration, movement, cargo,
employment or identity of all naval or merchant vessels or aircraft in interna-
tional traffic, and their personnel; instructions regarding guides to navigation
and the location of lights and buoys; the number, size, type, and location of
naval and merchant ships under construction and advance information con-
cerning dates upon which launchings are to be staged or vessels put in com-
mission, and the specific location of the launchings; the number, size,
character, and location of any floating drydocks in service or under
construction;
(d) The laying of mines or mine fields;
(e) The location, employment, protection, and strength of any harbor de-
fense or other fortifications, naval bases or military establishments wherever
located;
(0 The disposition, movement, composition, employment, equipment, per-
formance, and personnel of Army and Navy aircraft units;
(g) The fact or the result of experiments with war equipment and materials,
particularly new inventions;
(h) Specific information about war contracts, such as the exact type of pro-
duction, production schedules, dates of delivery, or progress of production;
estimated supplies of strategic and critical materials available; or Nation-wide
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the general concern for national security. 7 The FCC attempts to
achieve this balance by imposing a programming content standard
on the international broadcaster.8 The language of the current stan-
dard, however, is vague9 and the FCC has not provided any guidance
in defining the standard.' 0 Hence, it is questionable that free speech
or national security are protected, and even more uncertain as to
whether the content standard is a constitutionally permissible regula-
tion by the FCC.
This Comment examines the radio programming content stan-
dard imposed on private international broadcasters in the United
States. Generally, the history of private broadcasting" will be ex-
"round-ups" of locally published procurement data except when such com-
posite information is officially approved for publication. Specific information
about the location of, or other information about, sites and factories already
in existence, which would aid saboteurs in gaining access to them, disclosing
the location of sites and factories yet to be established, or the nature of their
production. Any information about new or secret military designs, or new
factory designs for war production.
(i) The movements of the President of the United States, high-ranking naval,
military, or diplomatic officials of the United States and its allies;
(j) Actual or attempted sabotage, or treason;
(k) Matters which, in the best judgment of the managements of the broad-
casting stations, might prejudice the conduct of the foreign relations of the
United States.
Id. at 2-3.
7 "National security" as used herein refers to the ability of a nation to avoid harmful
interferences in its domestic and foreign policy interests from forces outside its borders
that have gained advantageous information from individuals within the nation. National
security issues are particularly important during wartime. Consequently, the power to
control the free flow of information is greater during those times. See generally Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Although examples of the need for national security
during wartime are cited herein, this Comment primarily addresses national security con-
cerns during peacetime.
8 47 C.F.R. § 73.788 (1985). This standard applies only to private international
broadcasts. Government sponsored international broadcasts are not affected.
The content standard was not enacted for the explicit purpose of balancing national
security and free speech. It is, however, one criterion used by the FCC in determining
whether a license will be granted or renewed. See generally Garay, WRNO Worldwide: A Case
Study in Licensing Private U.S. International Broadcast Stations, 26J. OF BROADCASTING 641, 649
(1982) (statement by former FCC Chairman Charles Ferris). Consequently, the ultimate
denial of free speech in radio, i.e. denial of a license to broadcast, may occur if a potential
licensee's programming poses too great a threat to national security. To avoid complete
denial of free speech, the content standard may be seen as a programming guideline that
will not endanger national security. Hence in practice the standard works as a balancing
factor. The content standard is particularly important because it is a subjective standard as
opposed to the other requirements for an international broadcasting license that are more
objective. For instance, an applicant must be legally, technically, and financially qualified
and possess adequate technical facilities to carry forward the services proposed. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.731(a)(4) (1985).
9 See G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, FCC BROADCAST AGENDA No. 51868 (July 24, 1970)
(George S. Smith was Chief of the Broadcast Bureau & William H. Watkins was Chief
Engineer).
10 This author has not located any court decisions concerning the meaning of the
international content standard. The current supervisory engineer of international broad-
casting stated he was not aware of any FCC interpretations. Breig interview, supra note 4.
II While this Comment focuses on the history of private international broadcasting
from the United States, it is helpful to note the development of international broadcasting
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amined and specifically the origin of the content standard in the
United States will be traced. Finally, by reference to the FCC's
power ove r domestic broadcasters and the U.S. government's power
to protect national security, some illustrative interpretations of the
international broadcasting content standard are suggested.
I. Beginnings of International Broadcasting
In 1901 Guglielmo Marconi transmitted the first international
radio signal.12 His accomplishment inspired others13 to experiment
with long distance communication.' 4 These early experiments, how-
ever, were conducted on the low frequency band, 15 using increas-
ingly higher powered transmitters. 16 The high frequency band was
completely unexplored, 17 and its superiority for long distance com-
munication18 unknown.
By 1912, Marconi's contribution to broadcasting had been
widely publicized and duplicated in the United States. Conse-
quently, the low frequency band was crowded with signals from ama-
teur 19 transmitters. As a result, naval communications were severely
hampered. 20 The U.S. Navy sought congressional assistance to alle-
viate the amateur interference, 2' and Congress responded with the
first Act to Regulate Radio Communications (Act). 22 The Act,
in other countries. Broadcasts from other countries are generally government sponsored.
Therefore, international broadcasting developed quite differently outside the United
States. See generally J. Redding, American Private International Broadcasting: What Went
Wrong - and Why (1977) (published on demand by University Microfilms International).
12 D. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 1. The signal was sent from Southwestern England
and received in Newfoundland. It was merely a single transmission and not really a broad-
cast. Id.
13 For example, Reginald Aubrey Fessenden and Ernst F.W. Alexanderson whose
contributions to international broadcasting are detailed in D. BROWNE, supra note 2.
14 See generally E. BARNOUW, supra note 1, at 18-19.
15 See infra exhibit A, Some Characteristics of Radio-Frequency Spectrum, reprinted in
S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA, A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 39 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter exhibit A].
16 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 45-46.
17 Id. at 53.
18 Until the 1920s, radio communication meant Morse code transmissions. The work
of Reginald Aubrey Fessenden and Ernst F.W. Alexanderson led to transmission of voice
over radio. J. Redding, supra note 11, at 44. E. BARNOUW, supra note 1, at 19-20.
19 "Amateurs" in this context refers to non-military individuals who worked to im-
prove international radio signals. Some operated rudimentary radio equipment from their
own basements while others worked in groups, with equipment similar to that used by
Marconi. E. BARNOUW, supra note 1, at 25-35.
20 "[S]o many official messages were blotted out that naval authorities became in-
creasingly testy." Id. at 31-32. The original value of radio was thought to be in ship to
shore communication. The U.S. Navy was "convinced" of the benefits of wireless radio
transmission. J. Redding , supra note 11, at 44. The radio was so indispensably a part of
the Navy that the Wireless Ship Act of 1912 required "large passenger vessels to carry
radio equipment capable of exchanging messages at a distance of a hundred miles." S.
HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA, A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 155 (2d ed. 1972).
21 E. BARNOUW, supra note 1, at 31; J. Redding, supra note 11, at 53.
22 Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed 1927) [hereinafter 1912 Act].
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although intended to restrict amateur participation in international
broadcasting, actually expedited the development of international
broadcasting by private individuals.23
There were three important provisions of the Act. Section 15
stated that "[n]o private ... station not engaged in the transaction of
bona fide commercial business . . .shall use a transmitting wave-
length exceeding two hundred meters."' 24 This provision forced am-
ateurs out of the low frequency band 25 and was the impetus for
experimentation with high frequency. Section 4 of the Act provided
that the "Secretary of Commerce and Labor may grant special tem-
porary licenses to stations actually engaged in conducting experi-
ments for the development of the science of radio communication
.... "26 This section allowed the government to control the number
of broadcasters by requiring each to secure a license granted at the
Secretary's discretion. Perhaps the most important impact of section
4, however, was the language casting the amateur broadcaster's role
as one of experimentation and development. 27 Finally, section 2 of
the Act stated that "It]he President of the United States in time of
war... may cause the closing of any station for radio communication
... or may authorize the use or control of any such station or appara-
tus by any department of the Government .... -28 This provision led
to the discovery of radio power in times of war. 29
On April 6, 1917, President Wilson declared war on Germany. 30
Pursuant to section 2 of the Act of 1912, the Navy took control of the
operating facilities of all radio stations. 3' As a result, many young
men were trained by the Navy to operate international radio facili-
ties.3 2 After the war, these Navy-trained broadcasters returned
23 See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24 1912 Act, supra note 22, at § 15.
25 To fully understand the relationship between length of waves and the frequency on
which they are transmitted see exhibit A, supra note 15. Anything transmitted on a wave-
length of less than 200 meters is on the high frequency band.
26 1912 Act, supra note 22, at § 4.
27 In 1912 amateurs viewed themselves as experimenters. Therefore, this provision
was probably no more than a restatement of the obvious. The experimental classification,
however, meant that these stations could not commercially profit from their broadcasts.
Some authors consider this classification to have been a major handicap in the develop-
ment of private international broadcasting. SeeJ. Redding, supra note 11, at 55-56, 70-76,
79, 81; infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
28 1912 Act, supra note 22, at § 2.
29 "Radio power in times of war" has two separate meanings. In World War I the
power of radio was in ship to shore communication and in dissemination of war reports.
See generally E. BARNOUW, supra note 1, at 40 (calendar account of the duties of the radio
operator);J. Redding, supra note 11, at 48. During World War II the power of radio was in
propaganda. See generally C. ROLO, RADIO GOES TO WAR, THE FOURTH FRONT (1940) . See
infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
30 Pub. L. No. 65-1, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917).
31 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 57. The Navy took control of domestic as well as
international stations.
32 Id. at 48-49.
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home and continued to make advancements in international broad-
casting on the high frequency band.33
Finding it too expensive to equip an international radio station
independently, many Navy-trained radio operators sought to use
their skills in already established stations. The FCC had granted in-
ternational broadcasting licenses to General Electric (GE) and West-
inghouse, who were mainly interested in the stations as outlets for
testing new radio equipment they manufactured.3 4 Most Navy-
trained operators went to work for one of these companies after
World War 1.3 5 Thus it was natural that GE and Westinghouse be-
came leaders in the development of high frequency broadcasting
through the 1930s.3 6
These early international radio stations were classified as experi-
mental with the purpose of advancing the science of radio. Because
the stations were prohibited from making any commercial profit on
their broadcasts, 3 7 they were operated in the least expensive manner
possible.38 Because it was far cheaper to simply relay domestic pro-
grams than to create programming suited specifically to international
audiences, 39 the programs broadcast on international radio between
World War I and World War II were predominantly relays of domes-
tic programs.40
The legal aspects of international broadcasting were not signifi-
cantly altered by the subsequent Radio Act of 19274t and the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act).42Although
these acts addressed programming for domestic radio, international
radio was still classified as experimental. 43 Therefore, the program-
ming content did not appear to be terribly important. The presiden-
tial power to control stations in time of war was also continued in
both Acts. 44 The 1927 Act created the Federal Radio Commission to
oversee both domestic and international broadcasting. 45 This
agency, however, was replaced by the FCC in the 1934 Act. 46
33 Id.
34 Id. at 70-71.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38 J. Redding, supra note 11, 70-73.
39 The references to programs suited specifically to foreign audiences in this Com-
ment, means broadcasts in the native language of the country receiving the broadcast.
40 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 70-7 1.
41 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
42 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)).
43 Id.; Radio Act of 1927, supra note 41.
44 Radio Act of 1927, supra note 41, at § 6; Communications Act of 1934, supra note
42, at § 606 (1934).
45 Radio Act of 1927, supra note 41, at § 3.
46 Communications Act of 1934, supra note 42, at § 4.
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Although the 1934 Act remains in effect, there have been significant
revisions.
In 1939 the FCC issued its first set of revisions for the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. 4 7 These revisions removed the experimental
licensing criteria imposed upon private broadcasters in the 1912 Act
and continued through the 1927 and 1934 Acts. This allowed inter-
national stations to broadcast commercially and attempt to make a
profit. 4 8 The 1939 revisions also created the present content stan-
dard for international broadcasters. 4 9
The United States entered World War II in 194150 and once
again the Government took control of all international radio operat-
ing facilities. Utilizing thirty-five to thirty-six transmitters, 5 1 the sta-
tions were used to disseminate propaganda and war reports. 52 The
United States became a strong voice on the international airwaves.
When World War II ended, the Government had realized the
importance of international radio communication. With the passage
of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), 53 Congress created VOA and thereby es-
tablished a permanent government controlled broadcasting
service. 54
Private individuals were not prevalent in international broad-
casting after World War II. In 1962 there were only three private
international broadcasting stations. 55 VOA continued to grow 56 and
used the majority of frequencies allocated to the United States57 by
the International Telecommunications Union. 58 The FCC, however,
received applications from at least one licensee to expand its broad-
casting service5 9 and from others who wished to be licensed. 60 Be-
cause VOA was so large and made use of most of the frequencies
allocated for U.S. stations, the FCC was worried about a shortage of
frequencies and possible congestion if it approved the private appli-
cations it had received. 6 1 Consequently, in 1963 the FCC froze all
47 4 Fed. Reg. 2188 (1939) (effective May 23, 1939).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 77-331, 55 Stat. 796 (1941).
51 K. Cox, FCC BROADCAST AGENDA No. 16379, 2 (Feb. 27, 1962) (Kenneth A. Cox
was Chief of the Broadcast Bureau).
52 See generally C. ROLO, supra note 29.
53 Smith-Mundt Act, supra note 3.
54 Id. § 501.
55 K. Cox, supra note 51, at 3.
56 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 220-21.
57 Id. at 224-25.
58 The International Telecommunications Union is the governing body for interna-
tional radio frequency spectrum management. F. MATOS, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND EN-
GINEERING 5 (1985).
59 K. Cox, supra note 51, at 1.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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private international broadcast licensing.62
By 1973 the FCC revised its rules and lifted the freeze on licens-
ing.63 The private broadcasters were allowed more broadcasting
hours and began to compete with VOA for international audiences.
The content standard, however, was still imposed on them.
II. History of International Content Standard
From its inception in 1939, the international content standard
has never been fully interpreted by the FCC.64 The standard reads
as follows: "A licensee of an international broadcast station shall
render only an international broadcast service which will reflect the
culture of this country and which will promote international good-
will, understanding, and cooperation." 65 No license has ever been
denied specifically because the standard was not met, 66 nor has any
commission or court decision ever explained the standard.
62 "Freeze" on International Broadcasting, 25 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1547 (Apr. 19,
1963) [hereinafter "Freeze" on International Broadcasting] . The reasons given for the
freeze were: "(1) decreasing sunspot activity; (2) an increase in frequency usage by both
private international broadcast stations and by Voice of America facilities...; (3) pending
applications seeking authorizations for international broadcast stations ... ; (4) an increase
in the worldwide level of international broadcasting ...." J. Redding, supra note 11, at
250 (quoting "Freeze" on International Broadcasting, supra note 62).
63 38 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (1973). For a detailed discussion of the changes in the rules
and their importance to frequency allocation see J. Redding, supra note 11, 254-63.
64 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
65 47 C.F.R. § 73.788 (1985).
66 Prior to the enactment of the 1939 content standard, there was at least one denial
of a private international broadcasting license that may have been based on content con-
siderations. In April of 1939, one month before the content standard was enacted, the
FCC denied a broadcast license to the Pillar of Fire organization. In re Pillar of Fire, 7
F.C.C. 265 (1939). Pillar of Fire was an organization "engaged in spreading and teaching
the gospel ..... Id. at 266. They proposed a format of "one-third educational, one-third
religious, and one-third entertainment." Id. at 268. The Commission denied the applica-
tion for the following reasons:
[Ilt is extremely doubtful that the proposed station will render satisfactory
international broadcast service. Station operation will be . . .limited . . . to
England . . . .The applicant has not formulated a definite program of re-
search and experimentation which indicates reasonable promise of... con-
tribution to the development of the international broadcast service .... The
granting of this application and the operation of the station as herein pro-
posed would result in objectionable interference to .. .the operating hours
of existing licensed international stations .... Due to the type of equipment
applicant proposes to use, and to the frequencies selected, any division of
station time on these frequencies will necessarily result in a definite curtail-
ment of the international service now rendered .... The applicant has not
established a need for the frequencies requested sufficient to warrant the
granting of this application. The granting of this application will not serve
public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Id. at 273. In light of the foregoing FCC explanation for denial of a license to Pillar of Fire
and the state of world affairs in 1939, Redding questions whether the content of the pro-
posed broadcasts could have been the reason for denial. J. Redding, supra note 11, at 234.
According to Redding, the problems identified by the FCC were not insurmountable. Pil-
lar of Fire simply did not plan to add to the "propaganda surge from America." Id. at 233-
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Some understanding of the international content standard is
gained from examining the political circumstances at the time the
standard was enacted. In 1939 Germany was making very effective
use of radio 67 by broadcasting in the native languages of the coun-
tries receiving the broadcasts. 68 The Germans provided, among
other things, news and political discussions. 69 As one author states:
"The Nazi propaganda broadcasts.., began to be frequently men-
tioned as requiring official United States response in a similar
vein." '70 Meanwhile, in the United States, private broadcasters were
67 See generally C. ROLO, supra note 29. Congressional comment indicated that:
The quantity and effectiveness of Germany's... service increased.., during
the 1930s, until ... it was reported that:
Germany is now using 50-Kilowatt transmitters with highly directive an-
tennas. Some 8 or 10 transmitters capable of being connected to any of
15 to 20 directive antennas are being used . . . . Sixteen frequencies
have been put into use, and the German stations transmit to all parts of
the world .. .three to five frequencies are used simultaneously for the
same program .. .being directed to the points where there will be the
maximum number of listeners at a given time.
The programs are made up of music, entertainment, news, and political
talks. When these programs are directed to the Western Hemisphere,
English, Spanish, and Portuguese are used; for other parts of the world
the languages are those of the audiences.
Construction and Operation of a Radio - Broadcasting Station Designed To Promote Friendly Relations
Among the Nations of the Western Hemisphere: Hearings on S. 3342 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 94 (1938), reprinted inJ. Redding, supra note 11,
at 147-48 [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Construction and Operation of Radio].
The legislative history of the Smith-Mundt Act also demonstrates congressional con-
cern for counteracting Communist propaganda. For example:
In addition to feeding the minds of Europe, our expanded information
and educational program would serve as the necessary corollary to the Euro-
pean recovery plan. If our aid is to be politically as well as economically
effective, there must be general knowledge of our efforts. This has not been
the case in the past. A remark by a provincial French newspaper editor was
typical. "Everywhere," he declared, "you hear people saying that America
has done nothing for France .... Everywhere you can hear anti-American
talk and nobody denies the lies the Communists tell." Our Information Ser-
vice must explain our true motives and refute the lies that the recovery plan
is (1) a frantic effort to avert an inevitable American economic depression by
foisting off our surpluses on Europe; (2) an unjustifiable attempt to give pri-
ority in relief to the German aggressors over their victims; (3) a plot to re-
store the military might of Germany as our instrument to dominate Europe;
and (4) an instrument of imperialism designed to make of Europe a depen-
dency [sic] of the United States ....
Our Information Service cannot effectively explain our point of view nor
deny vociferous falsehoods in a whisper. We found it in fact to be only a
whisper. Hundreds of millions are being expended by the Soviets; and the
United Kingdom, although heavily in debt, supports a program employing
some 8,700 persons as against our less than 1,400 and costing three times
ours. Even little Holland is spending nearly a quarter of a million dollars this
year, and spent half a million last year in the United States alone to defend
and explain her policies. We are spending just over $30,000 in the Nether-
lands. It is the opinion of the committee that America is old enough and
strong enough to warrant a change of voice-a voice that will rise confidently
above the false call of communism.
S. REP. No. 885, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948).
68 Senate Hearings on Construction and Operation of Radio, supra note 67.
69 Id.
70 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 148.
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still relaying domestic programs. Although these broadcasters in-
creased their international audience oriented programming, 71 the
United States continued to lag far behind Germany in effective use of
international radio. 72 The Roosevelt administration was dissatisfied
with the U.S. response to Germany's propaganda and sought to en-
courage private broadcasters to provide "an effective, militant,
American voice on the high frequency bands." 73
The administrative actions taken to encourage a more effective
international radio voice from the United States are discussed by
Jerry Redding in his dissertation on U.S. private international broad-
casting. According to Redding, the administration first sought to
have Congress approve a government controlled high frequency sta-
tion. 74 When these efforts failed, the administration supported an
FCC revision of the rules governing international broadcasters. 75
The FCC agreed to revise the rules to encourage a more effective
U.S. voice on the international airwaves. 76 Consequently, the FCC,
with the assistance of the State Department, 77 drafted the content
standard.
The international content standard was hightly criticized by the
private broadcasters. Shortly after its issuance, editorial pages in
major newspapers were filled with accusations of censorship. 78 The
reactions were so negative and widespread that the FCC suspended
the content standard. 79 It remained suspended throughout World
71 Id. at 149-5 1. In 1937 the "private" broadcasters were General Electric and West-
inghouse. The radio stations these companies operated relayed programs broadcast by
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and Capital Broadcasting Company (CBS). In
the fall of 1937 the stations relaying NBC programming were transmitting two hours and
fifteen minutes of foreign language news daily in Spanish, Portuguese, German, French,
and Italian. CBS broadcast relays were in English 98% of the time. Id. at 150-51.
72 Id. at 151-55.
73 Id. at 156.
74 Id. at 155-60.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Censorship Seen in International Ruling, 16J. OF BROADCASTING 13 (June 1, 1939).
78 Newspapers See Censorship Danger in New International Ruling of FCC, 16J. OF BROAD-
CASTING 13 (June 1, 1939).
79 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 171. The FCC noted that:
[W]hen the rule was first adopted in May 1939, as Section 42.03(a), it was
subject to vigorous attack on "free speech" grounds. Editorials condemning
it appeared in the New York Times, the New York Herald-Tribune, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, the San Francisco Chronicle, and many other newspapers across
the country. On petition of the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.), a
four-day hearing was held ... during which representatives of the A.C.L.U.,
the NAB [National Association of Broadcasters], and most licensees of inter-
national broadcast stations then existing appeared to testify against the rule.
Following the hearing, operation of the rule was suspended "temporarily"
for a period of sixteen years. In 1955, the footnote suspending operation of
the rule was deleted without discussion in the course of a general rule-mak-
ing amending the international broadcast rules. Apparently, no case has
since arisen under Section 73. 7 88(a).
G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9, at 21.
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War II and was not reinstated until 1954.80
In 1970, over fifteen years after the reinstatement of the content
standard, the FCC noted some problem areas. George S. Smith,
then Chief of the Broadcast Bureau at the FCC, stated:
[T]he Commission would have to take into account the elements of
... our culture.... goodwill, understanding, and cooperation...
[in] programming or proposed programming. The staff believes
that these elements are of a vagueness that makes them difficult to
apply. An examination of commission records has failed to show
any discussion in the orders adopting the rules containing these
standards that would aid in refining or sharpening them.
8 1
In addition to the problem of vagueness, the FCC also indicated
that it did not believe its proper role was to define the standard. For-
mer Chief Smith questioned the FCC's judgment of international
broadcasting by stating:
If the answer is that the test is whether the service will imple-
ment and promote U.S. foreign policy, one may ask whether the
FCC knows this policy which, incidentally, is subject to change with
changing situations. The FCC does not know exactly what the inter-
national policy needs are with regard to each country of the world or
the world in general and our knowledge of the needs of each target
area is minimal.
82
The 1962 Chief of the Broadcast Bureau, Kenneth A. Cox, went even
further, commenting that "[in] the area of... programming.., the
staff has been handicapped . . . by lack of a clear definition of the
purposes and objectives of international broadcasting from the
agency which has this function, i.e., the Department of State."
8 3
Aside from the FCC's own problems with the standard, the
United States Information Agency (USIA)8 4 was less than supportive
of private international broadcasting in general. 85 In a letter to Mr.
Newton N. Minow, Chairman of the FCC in April of 1962, the USIA
stated:
We must report that . . .we are having great difficulty in as-
signing... frequencies. In addition, there is the policy question of
whether any given private international broadcaster is serving the
national interest through his programming. The importance of this
question is underscored by the fact that much of the world tends to
assume that international broadcasts speak directly for the govern-
80 20 Fed. Reg. 8198 (1954).
81 G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9.
82 Id. at 20.
83 K. Cox, supra note 51, at 7.
84 The USIA was created in the early 1950s by the State Department. Its purpose is
to control organization and funding of the VOA.
85 Contrary to this statement, the FCC files contain several letters from USIA pro-
claiming their support for private international broadcasting. The letters are prefaced
with phrases such as "[w]hile the USIA encourages the development of private interna-
tional broadcasting ...." See generally FCC Files on International High Frequency Broad-
casting From World War II Until 1963 (viewed with permission of Charlie Breig,
supervisory engineer of high frequency broadcasting at the FCC).
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ment of the country from which the broadcast originates. Additional
private international broadcasting from the United States could tend
further to confuse our world audience as to which is the authentic
Voice of America.
8 6
Due partially to both the lack of availability of frequencies and
the content of broadcasts, the FCC issued a freeze on licensing in
April of 1963.87 While the freeze was in effect, the FCC suggested
that the licensing of private international broadcasters might more
appropriately be handled by the U.S. Department of State or by
USIA, or abolished altogether. 88 In the same memo, the FCC dis-
cussed reasons why neither of these alternatives were particularly
appropriate. 89
In the case of a government agency, the FCC believed that giv-
ing the Department of State or USIA control over licensing of inter-
national broadcasters would be in violation of the spirit of the Smith-
Mundt Act. 90 This Act created VOA but specified that:
In authorizing international information activities under this
Act, it is the sense of the Congress (1) that the Secretary shall reduce
such Government information activities whenever corresponding
private information dissemination is found to be adequate; (2) that
nothing in this Act shall be construed to give the Department a mo-
nopoly in the production or sponsorship on the air of shortwave
86 Letter from Edward R. Murrow, United States Information Agency to Mr. Newton
M. Minow, Chairman of FCC (Apr. 2, 1962) (discussing problems with international
broadcasting). The letter also stated that: "[W]e [USIA] must now indicate our extreme
concern that due to the increased crowding of the frequency spectrum, any additional
private international broadcasting could well work to this Agency's [USIA's] disadvan-
tage." Id. At the same time, the U.S. Department of State also noted that "[in view of
existing and potential limitations on the availability of frequencies for international broad-
casting, the national interest requires that provision continue to be made to assure the
Government adequate frequencies for an effective information program abroad." Letter
from Edward A. Bolster, Director, Office of Transport and Communications, to Newton N.
Minow, Chairman, FCC (Apr. 4, 1962) (discussing possible licensing of private interna-
tional broadcast stations). The State Department went on to explain the breakdown of
frequency hours used by private broadcasters and VOA. They expressed concern over any
alteration in usage of the hours:
It is our understanding that a situation has already been reached in
which the number of frequency-hours authorized to licensees of international
broadcast stations for private operation has fully pre-empted the 25 percent
maximum. Accordingly, it appears that the authorization of any additional
frequencies to private international broadcast stations could only be by de-
traction from frequencies available to government international broadcasting
stations.
The Department considers that this situation poses very serious ques-
tions in relation to its observation, cited above, on the necessity for continu-
ing assurance to the Government of adequate frequencies for an [sic]
effective information abroad. We therefore urge the Commission not to act
affirmatively upon the application of International Communications, Inc.
prior to the taking of the necessary policy decisions.
Id.
87 See K. Cox, supra note 51; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
88 G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9, at 29-30.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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broadcasting programs, or a monopoly in any other medium ofinformation.9 F
If the State Department or USIA were given licensing responsibility,
control over private information dissemination could be total. The
above language clearly indicates an attempt to avoid such control.
The alternative suggestion, abolishing international broadcast-
ing altogether, is clearly in violation of the Smith-Mundt Act. 92 Part
two of the Act makes it explicit that the State Department9 3 should
not achieve a monopoly over international broadcasting. 94
In spite of its concerns over the content standard, the FCC re-
tained control of international broadcasting and kept the standard
intact. When the freeze on licensing was lifted in 1973, the only ap-
plicants interested in shortwave broadcasting were religious organi-
zations.9 5 The FCC believed this format raised no issues in regard to
the content standard and granted their applications. 9 6
In 1979 an applicant proposed a format other than religious
programming. Joseph Costello wanted to build WRNO to broadcast
"rock 'n roll" worldwide. 9 7 Although the content standard was not
specifically mentioned, the Commission questioned this type of
broadcasting. 9 8 The license was granted to Mr. Costello, but only
91 Smith-Mundt Act, supra note 3, at § 403. Despite this language in the Smith-
Mundt Act, the Department of State informed the FCC that:
[I]f it is shown that there is a need for the international broadcast proposed
to be rendered, it is suggested that, before any license is issued, there should
be agreement between your Commission and this Department with respect
to the need for the proposed service. On the other hand, it is felt that such a
statement should not actually appear in the rules of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9, at 21.
92 G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9, at 30.
93 Smith-Mundt Act, supra note 3, at § 4. VOA is basically the voice of the State De-
partment and consequently the concern that that Department not control international
broadcasting was really a concern that VOA not be the sole U.S. international communica-
tor on the airwaves.
94 Id. § 501.
95 J. Redding, supra note 11, at 232-48.
96 See id. It is interesting to note that the FCC did question whether religious broad-
casting complied with the content standard in 1970. They stated:
[T]he standard for assessing an "effective international service" is not
[clear]. The Commission has little know-how in the special aims and tech-
niques of a service aimed at proselytizing or informing, and customary tech-
niques for measuring performance against listener needs are inappropriate
to a medium where international policy ends are to be served; especially
when those ends aren't clearly known. If it is said that the measure of effec-
tiveness is whether the programs broadcast to target areas reflect our culture,
and promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation, how
does one know whether the hoped for reflection and promotion occur? Sam-
ple Problem: does a Christian religious program falling on Moslem ears pro-
mote goodwill, understanding, and cooperation?
G. SMITH & W. WATKINS, supra note 9, at 20.
97 See Garay, supra note 8.
98 Id. at 649.
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after several delays and a Commission hearing.9 9 This application
represented the beginning of what may be widespread variation in
international programming. Inevitably, the meaning of the content
standard will be questioned.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the content standard was
enacted to create a more effective U.S. political voice on the interna-
tional airwaves. It has failed to serve that purpose. The FCC must
now grapple with the meaning of the vague language and refrain
from imposing it to the point of infringement on free speech. With
diversity in international radio programming, however, there arises a
greater probability of national security threats. As a practical matter,
the FCC needs guidelines as to when program content may be con-
sidered a threat to national security and when protection of free
speech dictates no interference with the broadcaster's programs.
III. Legal Issues in International Broadcasting
The first amendment guarantees that "[C]ongress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... ."10 Although this
language is broad, the first amendment has not been interpreted as
absolute. As Justice Holmes noted, "the most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a thea-
tre and causing a panic."'' l Broadcasting has traditionally been sub-
jected to more restrictive first amendment interpretations than any
other form of communication.10 2 The regulation of domestic broad-
casting provides examples of the restrictions and is particularly com-
parable to international broadcasting.
A. Comparison to Domestic Broadcasting
One of the earliest and most explicit Supreme Court decisions
on the first amendment rights of domestic broadcasters was Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission.' 0 3 The case in-
volved a radio broadcast that constituted a "personal attack" on Fred
J. Cook.' 0 4 Pursuant to the fairness doctrine,10 5 which requires
99 Id.
100 U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
101 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
102 Compare Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n., 395 U.S.
367 (1969) (discussed infra note 103-16 and accompanying text) with Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co., Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) in which the Court held that a Florida
statute granting individuals a "right of reply" to newspaper articles was an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the freedom of the press. Id.
103 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
104 Id. at 372-74. At the time of the Red Lion controversy the FCC defined personal
attacks in the following manner:
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within
a reasonable time and in no event later than I week after the attack, transmit
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broadcasters to present public issues and to give fair coverage to
each point of view, Mr. Cook demanded free air time to reply to the
attack. The radio station refused to grant air time claiming that the
fairness doctrine, and its specific application in the personal attack
rule, was an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of
speech.' 0 6 Red Lion Broadcasting Company's contention was "that
to the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identifi-
cation of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a
script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1969). Some attacks were excepted from
paragraph (a). For instance, "attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures" and
personal attacks by "legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those as-
sociated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized spokes-
men, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; .... ... Id. Finally,
perhaps the most significant exception to paragraph (a) was for "bona fide newscasts, bona
fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (including com-
mentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph
(a) of this section shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee)." Id.
The controversy in Red Lion arose when WGCB aired a 15 minute broadcast by Rever-
end Billy James Hargis as part of a Christian Crusade series. The Reverend discussed a
book by Fred J. Cook. He stated:
Now, this paperback book by FredJ. Cook is entitled, 'GOLDWATER-
EXTREMIST ON THE RIGHT.' Who is Cook? Cook was fired from the
New York World Telegram after he made a false charge publicly on televi-
sion against an un-named official of the New York City government. New
York publishers and NEWSWEEK Magazine for December 7, 1959, showed
that Fred Cook and his pal, Eugene Gleason, had made up the whole story
and this confession was made to New York District Attorney, Frank Hogan.
After losing his job, Cook went to work for the left-wing publication, THE
NATION, one of the most scurrilous publications of the left which has cham-
pioned many communist causes over many years. Its editor, Carry McWil-
liams, has been affiliated with many communist enterprises, scores of which
have been cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the U.S. or by other
government agencies .... Now, among other things Fred Cook wrote for
THE NATION, was (sic) an article absolving Alger Hiss of any wrong doing
... there was a 208 page attack on the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover; another
attack by Mr. Cook was on the Central Intelligence Agency... now this is the
man who wrote the book to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater called 'Barry
Goldwater- Extremist Of The Right!'
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-72 n.2.
105 The Supreme Court defined the fairness doctrine in the following manner: "The
Federal Communications Commission has for many years imposed on radio ... broadcast-
ers the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations,
and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known as the fair-
ness doctrine .... Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369. The obligations under the fairness doctrine
must be met even if "done at the broadcaster's own expense .... " Id. at 377 (citing
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 895 (1963)). The Court also explained
the different requirements the broadcaster must meet under a personal attack claim as
opposed to a general claim under the fairness doctrine. They stated:
When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public
issue, both the doctrine of cases... and also the 1967 regulations ... require
that the individual attacked himself be offered an opportunity to re-
spond .... These obligations differ from the general fairness requirement
that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of competing views, in
that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting the attacked
party's side himself or choosing a third party to represent that side.
Id. at 378.
106 Id. at 386.
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the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted fre-
quencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to ex-
clude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency." 10 7
The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that the fairness doctrine,
with its particular requirements in cases of personal attack, was not a
violation of the first amendment.' 08
The rationale of Red Lion was based on the theory that " 'broad-
cast frequencies are limited and, therefore .... have been necessarily
considered a public trust.' "109 The Court noted that licenses are
issued only if the " 'public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby.' "110 Congressional interpretation of this language
demonstrated that broadcasters are required " 'to operate in the
public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discus-
sion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.' ""'1
Hence, because "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount,"' "12 the public has a
right to " 'full and complete disclosure of conflicting views on news
of interest to the people of the country.' "113 The Court concluded
that the fairness doctrine, and the protections it afforded in personal
107 Id. at 389.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 383 (quoting S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1959)).
110 Id. at 394 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964)).
111 Id. at 380 (quoting Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557,
§ 1). The Court devoted a significant part of the Red Lion opinion to demonstrating the
FCC's power, under congressional mandate, to implement restrictions such as the fairness
doctrine. They stated: "The authority of the FCC to promulgate ... regulations derives
from the mandate to the 'Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires' to promulgate 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such restric-
tions and conditions . . . as may be necessary .... ' " Id. at 379 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303
(1964)). The Court further noted that "[t]his mandate to the FCC to assure that broad-
casters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power 'not niggardly but expansive
.... I " Id. at 380 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219
(1943)). Finally, the Court pointed to congressional support for FCC regulations:
Congress, in 1959, announced that the phrase 'public interest,' which had
been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both
sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindi-
cated the FCC's general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public
interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier
statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. And here this
principle is given special force by the equally venerable principle that the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be fol-
lowed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially
when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction . ...
Thirty years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by
Congress until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, rein-
force the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act au-
thorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for
discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is free to implement this re-
quirement by reasonable rules and regulations ....
Id. at 380-91.
112 Id. at 390.
113 Id. at 384 (quoting Amendment of Communications Act of 1934-Conference Re-
port, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 17,830 (1959)).
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attack situations, helped the broadcaster meet his or her obligations
to the public.' 14
Based on the same rationale, the Court in Red Lion also noted
that the equal time requirement of section 315 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 was a constitutionally permissible infringement on
broadcasters.1 5 Section 315 states that "if any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcast-
ing station .... ,,116 The fairness doctrine and the equal time provi-
sion demonstrate restrictions of first amendment freedoms that are
unique to broadcasting. The restrictions are, however, of an affirma-
tive nature. In other words, they are not used to prevent licensees
from expressing their views; they are aimed only at assuring that the
public receives an opportunity to hear opposing views. This is an
important distinction because the Communications Act of 1934 spe-
cifically forbids the FCC to censor broadcasts. It states:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio communi-
cations or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation
or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communications. 117
In spite of this provision, the Supreme Court has held that the
FCC can prevent certain broadcasts in very limited situations. 1 8 In
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation 1 19 the Court
held that the prohibition against censorship did not prevent the
Commission from sanctioning the use of obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language in broadcasts.' 20 The case involved a monologue en-
titled "Filthy Words"' 12 1 which was broadcast by a radio station at
about two o'clock in the afternoon. A father and his son heard the
broadcast, found it offensive, and complained to the FCC. Although
the FCC imposed no formal sanctions, 12 2 it did issue a declaratory
14 See generally id.
15 See generally Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
116 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
17 Id. § 326.
18 Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
'19 Id.
120 Id. at 738.
121 Id. at 729. The Court described the broadcast as follows:
A satiric humorist named George Carlin recorded a 12-minute mono-
logue entitled 'Filthy Words' before a live audience in a California theater.
He began by referring to his thoughts about 'the words you couldn't say on
the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever.' He
proceeded to list those words and repeat them over and over again in a vari-
ety of colloquialisms .... Pacifica Foundation, broadcast the 'Filthy Words'
monologue.
Id. at 729-30. For a complete reproduction of the broadcast see id. at 751-55.
122 Id. at 730.
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order granting the validity of the complaint and characterizing the
language used in the broadcast as "patently offensive," "though not
necessarily obscene ... ."123 The FCC also noted that the order
would become part of the station's file, thereby possibly affecting fu-
ture license renewal of the station. 124 When asked to clarify its de-
claratory ruling, the FCC stated it "never intended to place an
absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but
rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely
would not be exposed to it."125 Furthermore, it reasoned that the
"declaratory order was issued in a specific factual context."' 126
Therefore the implication was that the same words in other circum-
stances would not evoke the same FCC response.
The Court found "[t]he prohibition against censorship unequiv-
ocally denies the Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts
in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate for the
airwaves .... [H]owever, [it] has never been construed to deny the
Commission the power to review the content of completed broad-
casts." 127 The Communications Act of 1934 was modeled after the
Radio Act of 1927, and the Court noted that in 1927 the prohibition
against censorship and the use of indecent language were included
in the same section of the statute.1 28 Under the assumption that
"Congress intended to give meaning to both provisions,"'' 29 the
Court reasoned that the censorship language must be read as inap-
plicable to indecent language.' 30
Pacifica, the fairness doctrine, and the equal time provision are
all qualifications of the right to free speech in the broadcasting con-
text. If all are applied to international radio broadcasting, they have
no more restrictive force than they do in domestic broadcasting. If
the analysis stopped here, it would appear that international broad-
casters could broadcast whatever they wished in the interest of pro-
123 Id at 730-3 1. The Commission rested its declaratory ruling on its "power to regu-
late indecent broadcasting in ... 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of'any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications' and 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(g) which requires the Commission to 'encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest.' " Id. at 731.
124 Id.
125 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
126 Id. at 893.
127 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735.
128 Radio Act of 1927, supra note 41, at § 29 provided:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communications. No person within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication.
Id.
129 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738.
Is0 Id.
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moting international goodwill, cooperation, and understanding, as
long as all sides of an issue were presented and obscene, indecent, or
profane language was avoided during times when children are likely
to be exposed. The factor that distinguishes international broadcast-
ing from domestic broadcasting is the concern for national security.
B. Limits Imposed for Protection of National Security
There are no cases that specifically deal with restrictions the
FCC can place on private international broadcasts in the interest of
national security. There are, however, a few "prior restraint"''
cases which deal with the power to prevent publication and dissemi-
nation of information that may be harmful to national security
and/or foreign policy.132
Near v. Minnesota 133 is one of the hallmark cases on the doctrine
of prior restraint. There the Supreme Court held that prior restraint
of a publication was "an infringement of the liberty of the press."' 134
Pursuant to a Minnesota statute prohibiting the publication of "mali-
cious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper . . .articles,"' 135 the
state of Minnesota sought a permanent injunction preventing the de-
fendant, Near, from future publication of his newspaper.136 Near ad-
131 A system of prior restraints is one in which any publication or broadcast would be
subject to governmental approval before it could be disseminated to the public. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 724-28 (1978).
132 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). As an agency
created by Congress, the FCC has only the powers delegated to it by that body. See supra
note Ill and accompanying text. It is not clear whether the FCC could exercise the same
restraints on free speech, in the interests of protecting national security, as the Depart-
ment of State could. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (discussed infra notes 191-
204 and accompanying text).
133 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
134 Id. at 723.
135 Id. at 702. The entire section of the act relied on by Minnesota read as follows:
Section 1. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or em-
ployee of a firm, or association or organization, or as an officer, director,
member or employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in the business of
regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in pos-
session, selling or giving away:
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other peri-
odical, or
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nui-
sance may be enjoined, as hereinafter provided.
Id. at 702.
136 Id. at 705. Near had published information charging:
[I]n substance that ajewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging
and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies
were not energetically performing their duties. Most of the charges were
directed against the Chief of Police; he was charged with gross neglect of
duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The
County Attorney was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with
failure to take adequate measures to remedy them. The Mayor was accused
of inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand jury was stated to
be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a special prose-
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mitted publishing the articles in dispute, "but denied that they were
malicious, scandalous or defamatory" 137 and claimed his publication
was protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 138
Initially, the Court noted that liberty of the press and free
speech were within the rights protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 139 These rights, however, are not abso-
lute and therefore a state could put limitations on their exercise.140
Under the Minnesota statute, however, the state was attempting to
completely suppress any further publication of the paper. 141 In the
Court's view this constituted the very "essence of censorship."
142 If
there was anything the constitutional protections of liberty of press
and free speech were intended to prevent, it was, in the Court's view,
the prior restraint of publications. 143
Finally, the Court in Near noted that prior restraints will not al-
ways be prohibited. 144 They cited one exceptional case: "'When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
cutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular,
to investigate an attempt to assassinate one Guilford, one of the original de-
fendants, who, it appears from the articles, was shot by gangsters after the
first issue of the periodical had been published. There is no question but
that the articles made serious accusations against the public officers named
and others in connection with the prevalence of crimes and the failure to
expose and punish them.
Id. at 704.
137 Id. at 705.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 707.
140 Id. at 708.
141 Id. at 713.
142 Id.
143 Id. The Court discussed the need for "immunity of the press from previous re-
straint in dealing with official misconduct" stating:
And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who reflect that to the
press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the
triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity over error and
oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficent source the United States
owe much of the lights which conducted them to the ranks of a free and
independent nation, and which have improved their political system into a
shape so auspicious to their happiness? Had 'Sedition Acts,' forbidding
every publication that might bring the constituted agents into contempt or
disrepute, or that might excite the hatred of the people against the authors of
unjust or pernicious measures, been uniformly enforced against the press,
might not the United States have been languishing at this day under the infir-
mities of a sickly Confederation? Might they not, possibly, be miserable colo-
nies, groaning under a foreign yoke?
Id. at 718-20 (quoting 5J. MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS 544 (1901)).
Although domestic publishers and broadcasters are recognized as serving the important
function of questioning governmental policy and keeping the U.S. public informed, inter-
national broadcasters may not be under the same duty. Private international broadcasting
is restricted to programming intended for and directed to audiences outside the United
States. 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1986). Therefore these broadcasters arguably have no duty
to keep U.S. citizens informed and hence may not be afforded as much protection as do-
mestic publishers and broadcasters.
144 Id. at 716.
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such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured
as long as men fight and that no court could regard them as pro-
tected by any constitutional right.' "145
Although the prohibition on prior restraint of publications was
later upheld in New York Times Co. v. United States 146 the members of
the Court were unable to agree on the parameters of the prohibition.
The Court issued a short per curiam opinion with six justices writing
separate concurrences and three filing separate dissents.' 47
New York Times involved an action brought by the Solicitor Gen-
eral on behalf of the United States to enjoin the New York Times and
the Washington Post from publishing certain "classified mate-
rial." 48 The material in controversy was information about U.S.
Government activities in Vietnam and became commonly referred to
as the "Pentagon Papers."' 49 The Court noted that any "prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity."' 150  Therefore, the
Government " 'carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of such a restraint.' "151 The Court concluded that
the Government had not met its burden and vacated the existing stay
order. 152 The individual opinions represented varying justifications
for the per curiam opinion.
The most ringing endorsement for freedom of the press was Jus-
tice Black's concurrence. He began by quoting the Government's
argument in support of an injunction: " 'The authority of the Execu-
tive Department to protect the nation against publication of informa-
tion whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems
from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent over the [c]onduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief.' "153 Justice Black, however, argued that to find
"inherent power"1 54 of the President to "halt publication of news...
would wipe out the First Amendment."' 55 He noted that
145 Id. (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47, 52).
146 403 U.S. 713.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 713.
149 403 U.S. 713.
150 Id. at 714.
151 Id. (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
152 Id. The District Court for the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, and the District Court for the Southern District of New York
had refused to grant a permanent injunction prohibiting the publication. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, granting the injunction. Therefore, the existing
permanent injunction was only against the New York Times. The Government was still
seeking an injunction against the Washington Post when arguments came before the
Supreme Court. The existing stay had been in effect for more than a week before the case
reached the Court. Id. at 724.
153 Id. at 718 (quoting Brief for the United States 13-14).
154 Id. at 719.
55 d.
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[t]he press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of govern-
ment and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
1 56
Ultimately, he concluded that "[t]he guarding of military and diplo-
matic secrets at the expense of informed representative government
provides no real security for our Republic."'
5 7
Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall stressed the Government's
lack of statutory authority for its argument. 5 8 The Espionage Act' 59
provides that:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control
over any document, writing ... or information relating to the na-
tional defense which information the possessor has reason to believe
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of any foreign nation, willfully communicates . . .the same to any
person not entitled to receive it ... [sihall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.' 6 0
The definition of "communicates" was held not to encompass publi-
cation. 16 1 Therefore, the Espionage Act was inapplicable and the
Government's claim rested on the inherent powers of the Execu-
tive.' 6 2 Justice Marshall stressed that Congress had denied the Presi-
dent the power he was currently seeking in two prior situations. 63
156 Id. at 717.
157 Id. at 719. Justice Black also quoted a particularly eloquent passage written by
former Chief Justice Hughes :
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peace-
ful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government.
Id. at 719-20 (quoting Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
158 d. at 720-24, 740-48.
159 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-799 (1970).
160 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793
(1970)). Justice Marshall quoted this same section of the Espionage Act. Id. at 745.
161 Justice Douglas explained that there were eight sections in the Espionage Act and
in three of those sections the word 'publish' was specifically mentioned. Id. at 721. Those
three sections banned publications concerning the disposition of armed forces, photo-
graphs, and cryptography. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(b), 797, 798 (1970)). None of
these sections were applicable to the materials in controversy. Injustice Douglas' opinion
"Congress was capable of and did distinguish between publishing and communication."
Id.
Justice Marshall noted that the lower court had found that "communicates" did not
mean publish, and that there was some support for that holding in the legislative history of
the Espionage Act. Id. at 745. Aside from this point, Justice Marshall also indicated that
even if the statute were applicable, it would possibly allow for criminal sanctions when the
material was published, but not a permanent injunction from publication. Id.
162 Id. at 722.
163 Id. at 746.
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During the debate over adoption of the Espionage Act, "Congress
rejected a proposal to give the President in time of war or threat of
war authority to directly prohibit by proclamation the publication of
information relating to national defense that might be useful to the
enemy."' 16 4 In 1957, Congress also rejected a proposal by the U.S.
Commission on Government Security to enact "legislation making it
a crime for any person willfully to disclose without proper authoriza-
tion, for any purpose whatever, information classified 'secret' or 'top
secret,' knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such in-
formation to have been so classified."' 65 Consequently, Marshall ar-
gued it was not the Court's place to create laws, "especially a law that
Congress has refused to pass."' 1
66
The Government's arguments received some support from Jus-
tices Brennan, Stewart, and White, although each still concurred in
the per curiam opinion. While noting that the "successful conduct of
international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national
defense require both confidentiality and secrecy,"' 16 7 Justice Stewart
concluded that the Executive had not met its burden of proof.' 68
Justice Brennan described the Government's burden as "proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the oc-
currence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea .... -169 The actual claim made by the Government
was that publication "could," "might," or "may . . . prejudice the
national interest in various ways."' 170 Justice White agreed that the
"United States [had] not satisfied the very heavy burden . . . it must
164 Id.
165 Id. at 747 (quoting 103 CONG. REC. 10,447-10,450 (1957)).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 728. Justice Stewart detailed his support for the Government:
If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power
in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense,
then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared
duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully. It is an awesome responsibility, requiring
judgment and wisdom of a high order. I should suppose that moral, polit-
ical, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of
that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake.
For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be
manipulated by those intent on self-protection to self-promotion. I should
suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security sys-
tem would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained. But be that as it
may, it is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as a
matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know
law-through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to
protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the
fields of international relations and national defense.
Id. at 728-30.
168 Id. at 730.
169 Id. at 727.
170 Id. at 725.
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meet to warrant an injunction against publication .... ,,171 Further-
more, he also pointed out "[i]f the U.S. were to have judgment under
.. [a mere grave and irreparable danger test] ... in these cases, our
decision would be of little guidance to other courts in other cases,
for the material at issue here would not be available from the Court's
opinion or from public records, nor would it be published by the
press. " 172
Although ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Harlan, and Justice Black-
mun wrote separate dissents in New York Times, the thrust of their
arguments were the same. Each focused on how quickly the issues
involved were decided. The information in controversy was approxi-
mately 7,000 pages of material' 73 and was simply too much to try to
comprehend in two days. 174 Therefore, they suggested that the in-
junction against publication be continued while the case was re-
manded for a full hearing. 175
In spite of the Court's clear prohibition on prior restraint of
publications in Near and New York Times, at least one lower court has
held a prior restraint to be proper in less than war time conditions.
In United States v. Progressive, Inc. 176 the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin held that a preliminary injunction
against publication of "The H-Bomb Secret; How We Got It, Why
We're Telling It" was proper.' 77 The issue before the court clearly
involved the "clash between allegedly vital security interests of the
United States and the competing constitutional doctrine against
prior restraint in publication."'' 7 8 The defendants argued that the
article "merely contain[ed] data already in the public domain and
readily available to any diligent seeker .... [O]ther nations already
171 Id. at 731.
172 Id. at 732.
173 Id. at 750.
174 Justice Harlan detailed the sequence of events leading up to oral arguments in the
case:
Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered judgment on June 23.
The New York Times' petition for certiorari, its motion for accelerated con-
sideration thereof, and its application for interim relief were filed in this
Court on June 24 at about 11 a.m. The application of the United States for
interim relief in the Post case was also filed here on June 24 at about 7:15
p.m. This Court's order setting a hearing before us on June 26 at 11 a.m., a
course which I joined only to avoid the possibility of even more peremptory
[sic) action by the Court, was issued less than 24 hours before. The record in
the Post case was filed with the Clerk shortly before 1 p.m. on June 25; the
record in the Times case did not arrive until 7 or 8 o'clock that same night.
The briefs of the parties were received less than two hours before argument
on June 26.
Id. at 753.
175 Id. at 752, 758, 761-62.
176 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 991.
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have the same information or the opportunity to obtain it."' 179 The
Government contended that "the danger [lay] in the exposition of
certain concepts never heretofore disclosed in conjunction with one
another."180
The court noted the strong prohibition against prior restraint
and the extremely narrow exception "involving national security"'18
as announced in Near. Although the court was convinced that the
article was not a " 'do-it yourself' guide for the hydrogen bomb,"' 18 2
it "could possibly provide sufficient information to allow a medium
size nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen weapon."' 8 3
Therefore, they concluded "that publication of the technical infor-
mation on the hydrogen bomb contained in the article [was] analo-
gous to publication of troop movements or locations in time of war
and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the rule against
prior restraint." 184.
The Wisconsin court distinguished New York Times on three
points: (1) the material in New York Times was historical information
relating to events that occurred several years before the time of pub-
lication; (2) the government was unable to provide cogent reasons
why publication should be prevented in New York Times, and simply
argued that it might cause some embarrassment to the United States;
and (3) New York Times did not involve the application of a specific
statute. 185 In Progressive the court noted that the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954186 prohibited "anyone from communicating, transmitting or
disclosing any restricted data to any person 'with reason to believe
such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an
advantage to any foreign nation.' ",187 According to the Act, "re-
stricted data" included " 'all data concerning 1) design, manufac-
ture, or utilization of atomic weapons; 2) the production of special
nuclear material; or 3) the use of special nuclear material in the pro-
duction of energy ....' " 188 The court was "convinced that the terms
used in the ... [Act] . . .- 'communicates, transmits or disclosed'-
include publishing .... "189 Hence, they reasoned that the Act pro-
vided strong support for prior restraint of the H-bomb article. The
Supreme Court never ruled on the prior restraint upheld in Progres-
sive because the issues were rendered moot by the publication of
179 Id. at 993.
18o Id.
181 Id. at 992.
182 Id. at 993.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 996.
185 Id. at 994.
186 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014-2280 (1954).
187 467 F. Supp. 994 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1954)).
188 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1954)).
189 d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1954)).
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similar information in another magazine. They did, however, have
occasion to rule on the protection of free speech when national se-
curity is threatened and a federal statute is applicable.' 90
In Haig v. Agee' 9 1 the Court held that the "President, acting
through the Secretary of State, [had] authority to revoke a passport
on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are
causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security
or foreign policy of the United States." 192
Agee was a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) who declared his intent "to expose CIA officers and agents
and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries
where they are operating."' 1 3 Pursuant to his intent, Agee publicly
identified undercover CIA agents194 and wrote two books identifying
individuals as CIA personnel.19 5 Secretary of State Haig revoked
Agee's passport on the grounds "that your [Agee's] activities abroad
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national se-
curity or the foreign policy of the United States."' 1 6 Agee objected
to the revocation of his passport because the "regulation invoked by
the Secretary [had] not been authorized by Congress and [was] im-
permissibly overbroad; ... and the passport revocation violated his
First Amendment right to criticize Government policies."' 19 7
The Supreme Court relied upon the Passport Act of 1926 (Pass-
190 Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 282.
'93 Id. at 280.
194 Id. at 284. Apparently it was necessary for Agee to travel to a particular country in
order to uncover agents working there. The Court explained the process:
To identify CIA personnel in a particular country, Agee goes to the target
country and consults sources in local diplomatic circles whom he knows from
his prior service in the United States Government. He recruits collaborators
and trains them in clandestine techniques designed to expose the "cover" of
CIA employees and sources. Agee and his collaborators have repeatedly and
publicly identified individuals and organizations located in foreign countries
as undercover CIA agents, employees, or sources.
Id.
195 Id. at 284 n.3.
196 Id. at 286. In support of the claim that serious injury could result to these people,
the Court noted:
In December 1975, Richard Welch was murdered in Greece after the
publication of an article in an English-language newspaper in Athens naming
Welch as CIA Chief of Station .... In July 1980, two days after a Jamaica
press conference at which Agee's principal collaborator identified Richard
Kinsman as CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica, Kinsman's house was strafed
with automatic gunfire. Four days after the same press conference, three
men approached the Jamaica home of another man similarly identified as an
Agency officer. Police challenged the men and gunfire was exchanged .... In
January 1981, two American officials of the American Institute for Free La-
bor Development, previously identified as a CIA front by Agee and discussed
extensively in Agee's book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, were assassi-
nated in El Salvador ....
Id. at 285 n.7.
197 Id. at 280. Agee also claimed that his right of freedom of travel was violated, and
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port Act) 198 which provides that:
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause
passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by
diplomatic representatives of the United States... under such rules
as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of
the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify
such passports.
19 9
Although the Court noted that the Passport Act did not specifically
give the Secretary the power to revoke a passport, " 'broad rule-mak-
ing authority' "was granted. 200 They noted that long standing presi-
dential, secretarial, and administrative construction of the Passport
Act, acquiesced in by Congress, indicated that the Secretary had the
power to revoke a passport. 20 1 Furthermore, although there had
been few cases "involving substantial likelihood of serious damage to
the national security or foreign policy of the United States as a result
of a passport holder's activities abroad, . . . the Secretary has consist-
ently exercised his power to withhold passports. ' '20 2 Finally, in re-
gard to Agee's first amendment claim, the Court noted the exception
allowed in Near and found that "the declared purpose of [Agee's dis-
closures was] obstructing intelligence operations and ... recruiting
of intelligence personnel." 20 3 The Court inferred that this rose to
the level of publicizing sailing dates and number and location of
troops. 2
04
In light of the foregoing cases, one should consider whether a
private international broadcaster may: (1) broadcast that he or she
has received intelligence information confirming that the United
States will pursue a covert operation to assassinate Muammar Kad-
dafi within the next twenty-four hours; (2) further state that U.S.
and British submarines are currently positioned off the coast of Libya
as part of the initial steps of this plan; (3) at a time when Ronald
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev are negotiating for a reduction in nu-
clear arms and have agreed to halt all nuclear testing during the ne-
gotiations, broadcast that the United States is still testing in spite of
the agreement; (4) broadcast that information has become available
that the United States kidnapped Adolf Hitler before the end of
World War II, masterminded his apparent death in Germany while
harboring him for fourteen years within the United States until he
died of natural causes.
that the "failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right
to procedural due process."Id.
198 22 U.S.C. §§ 211-18 (1982).
199 453 U.S. at 290 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976 & Supp. 1979)).
200 Id. at 290-91 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1964)).
201 Id. at 292-300.
202 Id. at 302.
203 Id. at 309.
204 Id. at 308-09.
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While these examples may seem mildly amusing, assuming each
broadcaster's report was completely accurate and true, could the
FCC prevent the broadcasts from airing or revoke the broadcaster's
license if he or she did air the material? Two issues must be analyzed
before this question can be answered: (1) Does the FCC have statu-
tory power under the Communications Act to revoke an interna-
tional radio broadcaster's license because it is aware that information
similar to the examples above is about to be aired or has already
been aired; (2) do any of the examples above rise to the level of
publishing information that will inevitably, directly, and immediately
cause imperiling of safety or amount to publishing number and loca-
tion of troops?
Under the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC is granted
broad powers over licensing of radio stations.20 5 In the realm of do-
mestic broadcasting, the FCC has denied license renewal to broad-
casters because it found the station was not operating in the public
interest. 20 6 In addition several applications have been subjected to
hearings before the full Commission, in part, at least, because of pro-
gramming deficiencies.2 0 7 Hence, although not often used, the FCC
has an established pattern of regulating domestic programming by
threatening nonrenewal. Under the Court's analysis in Agee this stat-
utory pattern, coupled with no congressional indication of disap-
proval, is strong support for the FCC's power to deny license
renewal based on content considerations. 20 8
In international broadcasting, the FCC has not established a
similar pattern. The power to regulate international stations, how-
ever, stems from the same Communications Act of 1934. Arguably,
the FCC can exercise the same threat of license nonrenewal if con-
tent specifications are not met. In international broadcasting it
would merely be a matter of applying a different content standard:
Does the broadcaster's programming reflect the culture of this coun-
try, and promote international goodwill, understanding, and
cooperation?
Aside from the time of license renewal, the FCC does not have
an established pattern, in either domestic or international broadcast-
ing, of simply revoking a broadcaster's license because of informa-
tion aired. Hence, it is not clear that the FCC could revoke an
international broadcaster's license immediately upon his or her air-
ing of information it found nonconforming to the content standard.
Furthermore, the FCC has no established pattern of reviewing
205 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
206 See LeFlore Broadcasting Co., 46 F.C.C.2d 980 (1974), license denied, 65 F.C.C.2d
556 (1977), aff 'd, 636 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
207 See, e.g., New Mexico Broadcasting Co., 54 F.C.C.2d 126, 134-35 (1975), one-year
license renewal approved, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1355 (1981).
208 See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying texf.
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broadcasts before they are aired and deciding whether they will be
communicated to the public. In fact, the Supreme Court made it
clear in Pacifica that the FCC could not "edit proposed broadcasts"
or "excise material" from the format. 20 9 Therefore, although the
FCC can enforce the content standard against international broad-
casters, it is not clear that the Commission can do so in any more
effective manner than to threaten license nonrenewal.
In addition to the FCC's power, if information similar to the ex-
amples above was proposed for broadcasting, or actually aired by an
international broadcaster, the Solicitor General might bring an ac-
tion to enjoin the broadcast or impose criminal sanctions on the
broadcaster. Pursuant to the Espionage Act, an international broad-
caster could be subject to discipline for "willfully communicat[ing]
... information relating to the national defense... [which he or she]
... ha[d] reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation . ,,"0 Although
in New York Times "communicates" was held not to include publica-
tion, it may include broadcasting. Hence, in addition to the FCC's
threat of license nonrenewal, the international broadcaster desiring
to air information similar to the examples above may face prior re-
straint by the Government or immediate license revocation through
criminal sanctions.
With some idea of who may regulate the international broad-
casters at any given time, the issue becomes what information the
FCC will consider nonconforming to the content standard and/or
the Solicitor General consider an actionable threat to national
security.
As in Agee, the first rule of statutory construction is to look to the
purpose of the legislation. Reflection of U.S. culture and promotion
of international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation originally
meant pro-U.S. propaganda. 21' There is little doubt that the draft-
ers sought a strong political voice on the airwaves. 21 2 Hence, the
content standard, at minimum, allows for political discussions by in-
ternational broadcasters. The standard, however, must be limited by
the legal standards set out in Near, New York Times, and Progressive.
In the first example given above, the international broadcaster
reveals a secret assassination plan. Basically he or she has put Kad-
dafi on alert and possibly made the U.S. objective more difficult to
achieve. The entire U.S. offensive is placed at greater risk, simply
because Kaddafi is expecting an attack. The location and number of
troops, however, has not been broadcast. Clearly the broadcast will
209 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735.
210 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
211 See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
212 Id.
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have a direct effect on the otherwise covert operation. The FCC,
however, will be forced to argue that the information does not meet
the content standard and that the possiblity of license renewal has
been greatly diminished by the broadcast. The Solicitor General, on
the other hand, may have a much more forceful argument that this
information relates to national defense and could be used to injure
the United States or assist a foreign nation. Therefore, pursuant to
the Espionage Act and the case law on protection of national secur-
ity, the Solicitor General stands a much greater chance of preventing
the broadcast or criminally sanctioning the licensee than does the
FCC pursuant to its content standard.
The second scenario takes the first example a step further. Now
the broadcaster has indicated the location of troops and tied the Brit-
ish to the operation. As to location of troops, Near clearly prohibits
the dissemination of that information. 213 With regard to British in-
volvement, the concern is a matter of international relations with a
neighboring country that trusted the United States to maintain se-
crecy. This type of concern may not come within the Espionage Act
because there is not a direct injury to the United States . The only
harm is to relations with Great Britain. Concern for international
relations sounds more like the language of the international content
standard. Therefore, if the broadcaster eliminated the information
concerning location of troops, the FCC may not be able to prevent
the broadcast, but the Commission may have grounds for challeng-
ing license renewal.
The third example posits the situation where an international
broadcaster reveals that the United States is not negotiating with the
Soviet Union in good faith. Again, there is no immediate injury to
the United States, only to our ability to negotiate. Arguably, the
broadcaster has promoted international goodwill by informing the
Soviet Union that it was not being treated fairly. The information is
embarrassing to the United States, and the Solicitor General as well
as the FCC would prefer that it not be broadcast. The authority for
either entity to prevent the dissemination of this information, how-
ever, appears to be lacking.
Finally, the fourth scenario focuses on events occurring several
years ago, but nonetheless presently damaging to U.S. relations with
other countries, i.e. allies during World War II. As in New York Times,
the information is not current and according to the Progressive court
that older information might more appropriately be published. 2 14
Once again, the broadcaster may promote international goodwill by
informing the world of the deceptive practices of the United States.
213 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. Publishing information, as in New
York Times, may be more readily acceptable than broadcasting. See supra note 102.
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Although, some countries may be so angered as to impose sanctions
upon the United States, it is not likely that they would retaliate with
direct physical force. Consequently, the Espionage Act may not pre-
vent the broadcast and the international content standard may en-
courage it.
There are no clear cut answers to the FCC's power under the
international content standard. It is apparent, however, that the
FCC is limited in the manner in which it can require compliance with
the language, not only because of the Communications Act of 1934,
but also because the language is unclear. Ultimately, the Govern-
ment has more control than the FCC over international broadcasters
pursuant to the Espionage Act. In as much as international broad-
casting by private individuals is growing and diversifying, the exam-
ples discussed in this Comment demonstrate the type of analysis
each licensee must apply to politically sensitive broadcasts.
LAURA J. HOLLAND
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